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Two conﬂicting tendencies can be seen throughout the biological world: individuality and collective
behaviour. Natural selection operates on differences among individuals, rewarding those who per-
form better. Nonetheless, even within this milieu, cooperation arises, and the repeated
emergence of multicellularity is the most striking example. The same tendencies are played out
at higher levels, as individuals cooperate in groups, which compete with other such groups.
Many of our environmental and other global problems can be traced to such conﬂicts, and to the
unwillingness of individual agents to take account of the greater good. One of the great challenges
in achieving sustainability will be in understanding the basis of cooperation, and in taking multicel-
lularity to yet a higher level, ﬁnding the pathways to the level of cooperation that is the only hope for
the preservation of the planet.
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1. NATURAL SELECTION AND EVOLUTION:
BRINGING ORDER TO THE BIOLOGICAL WORLD
The great biologist, Theodosius Dobzhansky, wrote
that ‘Nothing in biology makes sense except in the
light of evolution’ (Dobzhansky 1964, 1973). Without
question, the theory of evolution through natural
selection is the fundamental organizing theme in
biology, helping to explain the emergence of phenom-
enal complexity, the diversity of organisms and how
those organisms become arranged and inter-related
in biological communities and ecosystems.
Natural selection is a force, much like gravity (or, in
Wallace’s (1858) terminology, ‘a centrifugal governor’).
That we still do not understand all the implications of
natural selection, and its interactions with other inﬂu-
ences, should be no more surprising than that we do
not fully understand all of the implications of how grav-
ity works in situations where diverse bodies exert
interacting gravitational forces. In complex ecological
communities, natural selection is operating at many
levels simultaneously, and the consequences may be
impossible to predict, and very sensitive to ‘frozen
accidents’, random events that become ﬁxed.
As an explanatory tool, however, natural selection
helps peel away the mysteries of the biological world.
The explanatory power of natural selection is in its
simplicity: it is little more than a ﬁlter, acting on
random variation generated by chance events and
itself varying with secular changes in the physical,
chemical and biotic environments. Indeed, the basic
principles have proved useful in mathematical optimiz-
ation problems that are too difﬁcult for explicit
solution, and in the practical application to design
problems as diverse as how to synthesize effective
drugs and efﬁcient jet engines.
Charles Darwin (1809–1882) is, properly, recog-
nized as the father of the theory of natural selection,
although credit must be given to the inﬂuence of
Thomas Malthus, as well to Darwin’s friends, the
geologist Charles Lyell (1797–1875), who inﬂuenced
Darwin greatly, and Alfred Russel Wallace
(1823–1913), who independently proposed essentially
the same theory of natural selection in 1858 and
thereby induced Darwin to publish his works earlier
than he would have otherwise (Wallace 1858).
Darwin, the naturalist on the ﬁve-year voyage of
HMS Beagle, captained by Robert FitzRoy, was not
only able to draw pattern from his observations in
diverse climes, but to infer process as well. The idea
is a simple one: chance events continually produce
new variants, some of which are better suited in a
changing environment than the current common
type, and they leave more offspring, which themselves
reproduce. Eventually, such a new type will replace the
current type, only to be replaced itself in the future as
the environment changes further, and yet other types
arise. This is a never-ending tale, the inescapable
consequence of the simple rule. Different conditions
as well as initial evolutionary accidents produce
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isms we see today. But change is inevitable, and even
the human species evolves, and will continue to
evolve. Some changes in all species are minor; others
have major ﬁtness consequences, for example affecting
susceptibility to disease and suitability to changing
climatic conditions. At the broader level of multiple
populations, selection pressures can be sufﬁciently
different leading to speciation events.
Natural selection can be strong and lead to rapid
evolutionary change, as in the evolution of bacteria,
or it can be weak. But, even at its weakest, it is a
patient mechanism; and, given enough time, even
weak selection can give rise to fantastic diversity, and
mystifying complexity. One of the keys to the evolution
of that complexity is cooperation among diverse
types of organisms, which makes essential an under-
standing of how cooperation arises. As we will see in
later sections, cooperation was a challenge for the
classical theory, but recent and current research is
opening the curtains that have obscured clarity.
2. CHALLENGES FOR THE CLASSICAL THEORY
The theory of evolution through natural selection is, as
already discussed, a powerful tool for explaining how
change takes place, and how organisms are continually
reshaped in changing environments. It is sometimes
misconstrued, however, as leading to optimization or
perfection, and in its most naive form might be
thought to lead to a single best type. Natural selection,
in its simplest clothes, is, after all, a homogenizing pro-
cess; so how does diversity arise in the ﬁrst place, and
how is it maintained?
Climatic and other conditions across the globe are
highly variable, on many different scales, creating
uncountable opportunities for specialization. The
existence of such variation can select for mechanisms,
like mutation and recombination, that facilitate the
ability of genomes to exploit it. The homogenizing
effects of stabilizing selection are thereby balanced by
processes that restore variation, thereby maintaining
the adaptive capacity of populations.
Micro-organisms are nimble and short-lived, and
can take advantage of opportunities that we cannot
even measure. The ﬁrst organisms to evolve when
the Earth began were simple micro-organisms, prob-
ably under the Earth’s surface, or in its oceans. Over
billions of years, their cumulative effects produced
increasing levels of oxygen in our atmosphere, and
gradually led to the evolution of a greater diversity of
organisms, with each layer of complexity building on
what had already evolved.
Some organisms became more and more complex,
involving many kinds of cells, with different basic func-
tions. Humans, of course, are highly differentiated,
with speciﬁc tissues and organs for performing diverse
tasks; but even bacteria have specialized parts, such as
the organelles that serve as propellers to drive them
through their ﬂuid environments. Development of
organs from groups of tissues is universal in plants
and animals. They are all multicellular, meaning they
have more than one cell, including ones differentiated
for speciﬁc tasks.
(a) Cooperation, complexity and
multicellularity
Complexity can arise by the familiar processes of
mutation and recombination; however, this process is
inadequate to explain the degree of complexity we see
today. Other increases in complexity have occurred
when organisms have simply engulfed other organisms
that could perform particular functions, and then made
them part of a new whole. Lynn Margulis (1981),f o r
example, proposed that mitochondria, which are crucial
parts of eukaryotic cells, arose by a process of endocyto-
sis(ingestion)ofaerobicbacteria(whichrequireoxygen)
byanaerobicbacteria(normallyunabletoliveinoxygen-
rich environments), creating a permanent partnership.
Similarly, she developed the notion that chloroplasts,
which allow plants and eukaryotic algae to photosynthe-
size, emerged when photosynthetic bacteria were
ingested (see also Raven 1970).
These examples of complexiﬁcation arose from an
initial mutualism between different species. More gen-
erally, there are numerous examples of mutualism
between species in which the individual reproductive
identities have been maintained. Many sea anemones,
for example, incorporate single-celled algae, which can
photosynthesize and provide oxygen, glucose and
other foods to the anemones. Fungi and algae also
form symbiotic associations, lichens, deriving the nutri-
tional beneﬁts of algal photosynthesis, and the algae,
among other things, beneﬁt from water retention and
absorption of nutrients by the fungi.
We are multicellular; and, of course, so are most
organisms that we can see without a microscope.
Multicellular organisms are the most complex in
nature, and the multiple origins of this complexity
have provided another challenge for evolutionary
theory (Bonner 1993, 2000). Many, if not most,
examples of multicellularity probably arose simply
from cooperation among members of the same species.
This is, for good reasons, termed the colonial theory,
since it involves individuals ‘learning’ ﬁrst to live in
colonies, before those colonies became integrated
wholes over evolutionary time. Biologists have studied
colony formation in systems ranging from bacterial
mats and slime molds, to coral reefs and beehives,
from swarms of insects to schools of ﬁsh, from herds
of bison and wildebeest to primate troops. In human
societies, mechanisms of cooperation are well estab-
lished, but unfortunately limited in scope. We
cooperate in small groups, but often largely for the
purpose of competition and combat with other
groups. Unless and until we can learn to get beyond
that, and to achieve a multicellular state of mind that
encompasses all of humanity, our chances for global
survival are diminished.
3. THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION AND
COMPETITION AT HIGHER LEVELS OF
ORGANIZATION
There is much to be learned about cooperation among
humans by studying cooperation among other organ-
isms; but we must recognize that with each new case,
new mechanisms become important. Humans have
highly evolved capabilities of calculation and
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language with syntax. Imitation and evolutionarily
reﬁned responses to simple cues remain important,
but the human social context introduces complexity
that can foster cooperation at certain levels of
organization, and impede it at others.
Cooperation is at the root of multicellularity, and
cooperation is central to addressing our common
problems. At ﬁrst blush, cooperation seems exactly
the opposite of what natural selection—the survival
of the ﬁttest—is about. Yet, every living multicellular
organism represents a group of highly altruistic com-
ponents, and we see cooperation, indeed even
altruism, among members of many other species.
How does this apparent anomaly occur? How does
cooperation arise in communities of diverse organisms;
and why and when does natural selection not only
allow cooperation, but even reinforce it?
In the haplodiploid insects—the bees, the ants and
the wasps—most females are sterile workers, giving
up their own ﬁtness for the good of the colony.
Darwin (1859) was puzzled by these situations; in
Chapter VIII of On the origin of species, he wrote that
this paradox ‘at ﬁrst appeared to me insuperable,
and actually fatal to the whole theory.’ But Darwin
concluded that, although this was ‘by far the most
serious special difﬁculty that my theory has encoun-
tered’, nevertheless, natural selection could fully
account for such extreme altruism, provided selection
was operating at a higher level of organization—‘the
family’. In this, he anticipated later solutions to the
problem, but without knowing of the more speciﬁc
genetic explanations that would come nearly a century
later, or the inevitable debates about group selection
and when it could operate (Lehmann et al. 2007).
Darwin, not surprisingly, also recognized the relevance
to the central theme of this paper, cooperation among
humans: ‘We can see how useful their production
may have been to a social community of ants, on the
same principle that the division of labour is useful to
civilized man’. I will return to this theme shortly.
The inﬂuential British biologist, J.B.S. Haldane,
reportedly explained apparent altruism most suc-
cinctly, when he said ‘I’d lay down my life for two
brothers or eight cousins’. What Haldane meant
simply was that, since he shared half his genes with
each brother, two brothers together would carry as
many of his genes as did he himself. Similarly, since
children share half their parents’ genes, two ﬁrst
cousins share one-eighth of their genes with one
another, so eight cousins are equivalent to two
brothers, or equivalent to Haldane himself.
Nowhere is such altruistic behaviour between multi-
cellular individuals more widespread than in the
haplodiploid insects. Why should that be? Haplodip-
loid means that males are haploid—they arise from
unfertilized eggs, so only get the genes that their
mothers contribute. Females are diploid—they get
half their genes from their fathers, and half from
their mothers. Because all the sperm produced by a
male are genetically identical, full sisters share all the
genes that they received from their fathers, and half
the genes that they received from their mothers.
Therefore, on average, sisters born of the same father
are identical in three-fourths of their genes. Compare
that with the fact that Haldane’s sister, Naomi
Mitchison, would have shared only one-half of her
genes with any sisters, or with J.B.S. himself. For a
haplodiploid insect, then, there is even greater incen-
tive to be altruistic. The late evolutionary biologist
William D. Hamilton worked out the esoteric math-
ematical details of this idea, later called ‘kin
selection’, in a pair of fundamentally important
papers. (Hamilton 1964a,b).
Kin selection certainly provides insight into why
individuals help their kin, but cooperative behaviour
among non-kin is widespread in animal societies.
The simplest explanation for such behaviour is called
‘reciprocal altruism’, in which individuals engage in
altruistic acts in the expectation that the favour will
be returned at some time in the future. We are, of
course, very familiar with such behaviour in human
societies, and reinforce it by forming friendship
bonds, or other such groupings. However, similar
reciprocal cooperation can occur when individuals
interact more diffusively within large groups, as long
as there is a reasonable expectation that the beneﬁci-
aries will exhibit similar altruistic tendencies. The
difﬁculty is that, as groups get large, that expectation
goes down. Groups split into smaller groups in
which reciprocal altruism can be maintained,
and these groups may then interact competitively and
aggressively with other groups.
As our societies have grown larger, the simplest
forms of reciprocal altruism have broken down. Over
our history, in culture after culture, small tribal
groups, held together by reciprocal altruism, have real-
ized that there are beneﬁts to be gained by banding
together with other such tribal groups, often in order
to compete with yet other such larger groups. At this
level, though, reciprocal altruism is not enough, and
common rules must be agreed upon, together with
punishments for violating those rules, often called
‘social norms’. Those rule systems have become for-
malized as laws and customs, holding together
societies and religions. Recent experiments (see for
example Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Fehr & Gaechter
2000) have shown that, over millennia of cultural evo-
lution, individuals have internalized such rules, as well
as the willingness to punish defectors, even at cost to
the punisher. In the case of religions, the threat of pun-
ishment can be especially effective, because it is
reserved for a future time, after death, making it
impossible to judge whether it really will be imposed.
Understanding social norms, and cultural behav-
iour more generally, is a research undertaking of
deep theoretical and empirical importance. This is
not a new topic, and a theoretical foundation has
been built over the past quarter century (see for
example Wilson 1975; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman
1981; Axelrod 1984; Boyd & Richerson 1985; Ehrlich
2000; Wilson 2002; Bowles & Gintis 2004; Durrett &
Levin 2005; Nowak & Sigmund 2007). Increasingly,
however, it has become clear that if we are to ﬁnd
solutions to global environmental and economic pro-
blems, we will need increased emphasis on such
efforts to understand how to achieve cooperation
among nations (Levin 1999; Ehrlich & Kennedy 2005;
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and the economy, existing institutions are insufﬁcient
to prevent tragedies of the commons, and the time is
short to learn how to establish them (Walker et al.
2009).
Social norms can play highly beneﬁcial roles within
our societies, prohibiting socially damaging behaviours
like theft, adultery and murder, and encouraging re-
spect for our environment. But social norms equally
canbedamaging,leadingtothemaintenanceofdiscrim-
inatory caste systems, or leading to overconsumption
and the exploitation of environmental resources. My
Princeton colleague, Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his
book The Ethics of Identity, confronts this dilemma by
asking, ‘Is culture a good?’ (Appiah 2007). This man-
dates a search for values and social norms that involve
mutual respect, as well as respect for our diverse pasts
and common future.
A second challenge, to which I return in the last sec-
tion, is that groups with common interests and
common norms often owe their existence to the fact
that these coalitions provide advantages in competition
with other groups. Once those external threats disap-
pear, the groups have less reason to exist, and are
likely to fragment and turn to internal conﬂict. Our
challenge is to ﬁnd ways to maintain cooperation in
the common good even without the mechanism of
competition and conﬂict with other groups.
4. THE GLOBAL COMMONS
Recent years have seen a growing awareness of the
deteriorating state of our environment. Our consump-
tive patterns have led to a toxiﬁcation of our
environment, accelerated climate change, and
depleted biodiversity and other natural resources;
growing conﬂicts among peoples are in no small way
linked to these changes. Though we are the cause,
we stand as observers, seemingly powerless to reverse
the effects of our own actions. Why?
The problem is that we live in a Global Commons,
in which we bear neither the full costs, nor the full
beneﬁts, of our actions. We feel individually only
marginally responsible for the world’s problems, and
that our own sacriﬁces will do little to improve the situ-
ation. Economic markets, counted on by many to
resolve problems of shortages, do not work effectively
because they ignore the social costs, the externalities,
and shortchange future generations by imposing high
discount rates.
When we lived in small groups, and when our
effects were regionally limited, this was less of a
problem. Reciprocal altruism had a chance to work,
even without the stimulus of intertribal conﬂict. As
groups became larger, however, globalization
increased, and our problems assumed larger and
even global scales, while their solutions faded further
into the distance. Intra-group cooperation remained
strong, and nationalism increased; but conﬂicts
among nations made matters worse.
Even in small societies, problems of the commons
require work to resolve. Lloyd (1833), an Oxford
political economist, puzzled about the stunted status
of cattle on common pasture areas in England:
‘Why are the cattle on a common so puny and stunted?
Why is the common itself so bare-worn, and cropped
so differently from the adjoining inclosures?’ The
answer, he concluded, was in a microcosm of the
problems we face today. As Hardin (1968) explained
Lloyd’s arguments more than a century later, the com-
mons environment creates a conﬂict in which there is
beneﬁt to the individual to overexploit, but cost to
society. ‘Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked
into a system that compels him to increase his herd
without limit—in aworld that is limited. Ruin isthe des-
tination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his
ownbest interest ina society that believesinthe freedom
of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all’. Hardin called this the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’.
Lloyd’s insights caused a sea change in Hardin’s
thinking, in which he realized that the conventional
economic thinking fell short of providing solutions.
‘With Adam Smith’s work as a model, I had assumed
that the sum of separate ego-serving decisions would
be the best possible one for the population as a
whole. But presently I discovered that I agreed much
more with William Forster Lloyd’s conclusions...
Citing what happened to pasturelands left open to
many herds of cattle, Lloyd pointed out that, with a
resource available to all, the greediest herdsmen
would gain—for a while. But mutual ruin was just
around the corner. As demand grew in step with popu-
lation (while supply remained ﬁxed), a time would
come when the herdsmen...would be trapped by
their own competitive impulses. The unmanaged com-
mons would be ruined by overgrazing; competitive
individualism would be helpless to prevent the social
disaster.
So must it also be, I realized, with growing
human populations when there is a limit to available
resources. ... It was so in Lloyd’s day; it is even
more so today.’
These are the challenges we still face today, but they
are greater and more compelling than ever before.
These are the challenges that require we ﬁnd a collec-
tive mission, built on cooperation and common
purpose. The scientiﬁc study of cooperation has a cen-
tral role to play in achieving that cooperation, and
must involve multidisciplinary approaches, from evo-
lutionary theory to economics. This has, for example,
led the European Science Foundation to launch a
recent research programme on ‘Evolutionary Perspec-
tives on Cooperation and Trading’. It has never been
more evident than in the desperate international
efforts to ﬁnd coordinated solutions to the current
global economic meltdown.
5. ACHIEVING COOPERATION AT THE
HIGHEST LEVELS
Cooperation is widespread in the biological world,
especially in human societies. Bacteria signal one
another by exuding chemicals, and exchange mutual
favours (Wingreen & Levin 2006; Nadell et al.
2008a,b). Amoebae organize themselves into slime
molds, insects into swarms, birds into ﬂocks, ﬁsh
into schools, ungulates into herds. Primates have the
most highly developed social organizations of
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cultural practices to maintain the integrity of their
societies.
But the tribes and societies and cultures we build
become devices for conﬂict among groups, and too
often it is that conﬂict and competition that strength-
ens the membership bonds. When groups come
together, it is often because there is a common
enemy. How can we get beyond this in achieving the
survival of our species, and of our planet?
We must recognize that we have a common enemy,
and that enemy is the extinction that awaits us if we do
not change our ways. It is war and pollution, it is bio-
diversity loss and climate change, it is all the things
that threaten the quality of our life, as well as our sur-
vival. The sooner we acknowledge this common threat,
the sooner we can achieve the cooperation that will
bond us all together.
However, as discussed earlier, cooperation becomes
more difﬁcult to sustain as group size increases.
Among humans, this constraint has been met through
informal agreements, what Hardin (1968) called
‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon’, which ulti-
mately may become formalized into traditions,
customs, rules and laws. These agreements may pro-
vide individuals within the groups beneﬁts they
would not have if solitary, or in smaller groups; but
they also can become sustained even if they do not
confer beneﬁts, simply because defectors are pun-
ished. Societies thereby become locked into patterns
of behaviour—social norms—that are curiously resist-
ant to change over long periods of time, sometimes
centuries; but, just as mysteriously, those patterns of
behaviour can collapse suddenly, giving rise to rapid
change in collective behaviour. A famous example
involves the practice of foot-binding in China, but
changes also occur rapidly in patterns of dress, in atti-
tudes towards smoking and with regard to the role of
women in many societies. These transitions are
driven by contagious behaviours, as individuals imitate
other individuals; but certain individuals occupy pos-
itions of key inﬂuence, and can trigger such societal
shifts in behaviour. This is true not only in human
societies, but in almost all animal groupings. The
phenomenon has been observed in experimental situ-
ations, as well as in theoretical models that explore
the relationship between leaders and followers
(Couzin et al. 2005). Couzin and co-workers are inter-
ested in the mechanisms that result in the coordination
of schools and swarms in ﬁsh, birds and other species;
but lessons are apparent for understanding collective
decision-making in humans. The remarkable insight
is that a very small number of leaders can cause
shifts in behaviours of large groups of individuals,
and lead them to coordinate their behaviours. Like a
collection of self-stimulating pendulums, they easily
become synchronized in their actions, a powerful
collective force rather than a random collection with-
out communality. This perhaps should not surprise
us based on our understanding of human groups.
The problem is that those few inﬂuential individuals
can as easily lead in bad directions as in good; the
models do not discriminate. Our challenge thus is to
ﬁnd the leaders who can take us down good paths.
There are those that argue that we cannot hope to
achieve the necessary changes in our societies without
laws and punishments imposed from the top down.
That may or may not be true, but those top-down con-
straints will be difﬁcult or impossible to impose if they
do not reﬂect popular movements that lay the ground-
work for them. Changing social norms creates the
milieu in which bold leadership is possible; it is
where we must begin. This imperative makes the
strong case for the multidisciplinary research efforts
mentioned earlier, or for collaboration among natural
scientists and social scientists, theoreticians and
experimentalists. Cooperation among such diverse
researchers will be the key experimental test of whether
we can achieve the cooperation necessary to achieve a
sustainable future.
I gratefully acknowledge invaluable comments from John
Tyler Boner, Adrian deFroment, Paul Ehrlich, Carey
Nadell and Carole Levin.
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